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THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
HUMANITARIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Rosemary Jenks*
Statistics reveal an extensive problem in the refugee/immigration arena. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimated in January 1994 that there are 19.7 million refugees worldwide
and an additional 25 million internally displaced persons. The UNHCR
says that in 1993, 10,000 people were forced into flight every day. The
Freedom House reported last year that 2.2 billion people, 41% of the
world's 5.4 billion population, live under conditions that are "not free,"
while an additional 40% live under conditions that are only "partially
free." There is simply no way that the industrialized world can resettle
all of these people. Developed countries must begin looking for other
more effective and cost-efficient ways to help refugees.
In fiscal year 1993, the United States admitted almost 119,500 refugees for permanent resettlement. In the same year, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) received 150,386 affirmative applications
for asylum. An additional 13,594 defensive asylum claims were filed
with the Executive Office of Immigration Review. There are now some
400,000 asylum applications pending. It is clear that the U.S. asylum
system cannot deal with these numbers.
One way to address some of these problems is to return to the original intent of the 1980 Refugee Act. A primary goal of the Refugee Act
was to remove Cold War politics from the refugee program and ensure
that all claimants for refugee status were given an equal opportunity to
have their claims examined on a case-by-case basis. This has not happened. Cold War politics continue to distort the refugee program, even
after the end of the Cold War.
Currently the Lautenberg Amendment establishes presumptive categories for Jews and Evangelical, Catholic, and Orthodox Christians residing
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in any independent state of the former Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, or
Lithuania, and for nationals of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. These
applicants are not required to show a "well-founded fear of persecution."
They simply have to demonstrate the possibility of persecution or discrimination, for example, by showing that their government has discriminated against any member of their particular religious or ethnic group at
any time in their locale.
Second, there is the Amerasian program. Although this program is not
technically a refugee program, Amerasians are included in the refugee
admissions ceiling and they are entitled to federally-funded refugee
transitional support services. The U.S. Department of State and other
agencies involved in the program have acknowledged that it has led to
massive fraud. People are falsely claiming to be Amerasians or the relatives of Amerasians. In 1992, 37% of the Amerasians the United States
admitted--exclusive of family members--were born more than nine
months after the last active-duty American soldier left Vietnam.
The result of such presumptive categories is that, since 1990, more
than 41% of U.S. refugee admissions are from the former Soviet Union
and almost 36% are from Vietnam. Close to 100% of those from the
former Soviet Union and 80% of the Vietnamese have family members
in the United States. Rather than being resettled under the publicly-funded refugee program, those who are eligible should be applying for family-sponsored immigrant visas. Resettlement under the U.S. refugee program should be available only to those who have no other suitable
option, and then only if they meet the United Nations definition of a
refugee.
The 1980 Refugee Act also recommended a target level of 50,000
refugee admissions annually under normal circumstances. The refugee
ceiling has exceeded 100,000 every year since 1989, and has never been
set lower than 67,000, which was in 1986. Federal funding of the refugee resettlement program has declined dramatically relative to the increasing number of admissions. Refugees were originally entitled to
three years of federally-funded transitional support services. Now they
are entitled to only eight months of federal assistance, so state and local
governments are being forced to foot the bill for ongoing social services, health care, and language and job training.
The asylum provisions in the 1980 Refugee Act were designed to
provide temporary protection to aliens already in the United States on
non-immigrant visas in cases where the situation in the home country
deteriorated to. the extent that they could not return home safely. Because the number of such aliens was expected to remain small-between
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2,500 and 5,000-a limit of 5,000 was placed on the number of asylees
who could adjust to permanent resident status each year. The Immigration Act of 1990 increased that ceiling to 10,000 because the number of
asylum claimants had risen considerably over the past decade.
The asylum system has also been a victim of politics. The Cuban
Adjustment Act-a relic of Cold War politics-still virtually guarantees
that any Cuban who reaches the United States will be granted permanent
residence. The Executive Order on "enhanced consideration" for asylum
seekers claiming persecution on the basis of one-child-per-family population policies-an expression of Reagan-Bush abortion politics-is an
invitation to the millions of Chinese men and women of child-bearing
age. Because of the politics involved, the Clinton administration has
tried to duck the issue. Attorney General Janet Reno recently declined to
review two Chinese cases referred to her by the Board of Immigration
Appeals, which sought a definitive decision on the "enhanced consideration" policy.
The massive increase in the number of asylum applications, combined
with the shortage of INS asylum personnel, immigration judges, and
detention facilities, the extensive appeals process, the lack of an adequate identification or tracking system for asylum seekers, the routine
issuance of work permits during adjudication, and an equally cumbersome deportation process have created a wholly ineffective asylum system. The United States cannot handle the numbers of applicants that it
is receiving.
Both the U.S. refugee program and asylum system are in need of
major reform. First, the United States needs to pare the refugee resettlement program back down to the 50,000 annual admissions ceiling recommended by the Refugee Act. Second, the United States should repeal
the Lautenberg Amendment and return to the case-by-case determinations which were the intent of the law. Finally, the Amerasian program
is due to expire in 1994, but Congress is considering legislation to
establish a similar program for children of Filipinos and American servicemen, which is likely to encourage as much or more fraud as the
Amerasian program for Vietnamese. This legislation should not be
passed. Eligible family members of U.S. citizens and legal residents
should enter the United States as family-sponsored immigrants-not as
refugees. If they have family members here who are able to support
them, those family members should be supporting them; it should not be
the burden of the taxpayer. Taxpayers are willing to be generous with
refugees, but only with genuine refugees.
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The Clinton administration has proposed limited measures to address
the abuse of the U.S. asylum system. These measures represent a step in
the right direction, but they do not go far enough. It is clear to all
parties that the United States needs increased resources for asylum personnel, immigration judges, and detention facilities. Expedited asylum
screening provisions will be crucial in any effort to stay current with
new applications, as will summary exclusion provisions, which are not
included in the Clinton proposal. Under the Clinton plan, applications
denied by asylum officers would be automatically referred to immigration judges to begin the deportation or exclusion proceedings. Manifestly
unfounded asylum applications would be referred immediately to an
immigration judge without an interview by an asylum officer. The appeals process would be limited by restricting judicial review to petitions
for habeas corpus. Another very important reform in the administration
proposal would be the withholding of a work permit for 180 days after
the application is filed, or until a decision is made. The decoupling of
the work permit from the initial asylum application process is essential,
as work is a major magnet for aliens entering the United States primarily for economic reasons. Presently, once one has a work permit, one can
get a driver's license and a social security card--the documentation necessary to remain in the United States indefinitely, whether asylum is
granted or not.
The major drawbacks of the Clinton administration's proposal are
two-fold. First, it delays for at least a year attempts to deal with the
huge backlog of pending asylum claims, and this is based on an overly
optimistic assumption that, with additional personnel and the new regulations, the INS will be current in processing new applicants in about a
year, at which point it could begin processing those in the backlog. The
plan also fails to recognize the possibility that by shifting more responsibility from the INS Asylum Corps to immigration judges, the effect
may simply be to shift the backlog of cases from the Asylum Corps to
the Executive Office of Immigration Review. Second, the Clinton plan
does not address the obvious need to facilitate the exclusion or deportation of rejected asylum seekers. An expedited adjudication process will
not serve as a deterrent to fraudulent or unfounded asylum claims unless
those who are denied asylum are actually removed from the United
States.
Other needed reforms that have not yet been proposed include the
repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act and the rescission of the Executive
Order on "enhanced consideration" for Chinese. The United States
should ensure that class actions never become the substitute for the
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burden of proof being on the alien, who may be using the asylum process as a "back door" means to immigrate to the United States. Finally,
the United States needs to establish a computerized finger-printing system for all asylum seekers so that they can be identified and located.
In the end, if the United States hopes to maintain public support for
its humanitarian immigration program, which has been very generous
through its history, it has to be a fair and nondiscriminatory system. It
has to be adequately funded by the federal government so as to avoid
placing citizens and legal residents in competition with refugees or asylum seekers for limited public monies at the state and local levels. The
United States has to curb the large-scale abuse of the asylum system
that has been so publicized recently. The United States should return to
the original intent of the 1980 Refugee Act, which was to establish a
manageable, orderly, cost-effective and nondiscriminatory humanitarian
immigration program.

